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CONTRACTUAL WAIVER BY LABOR UNIONS OF EMPLOYEES'
SOLICITATION-DISTRIBUTION RIGHTS: TIME FOR A
RESOLUTION-
Implicit in the right of self-organization granted to employees by Section 7
of the National Labor Relations Act' are the rights to solicit membership in a
labor union and to distribute literature in furtherance of that solicitation.2
These rights are indispensable to a national labor policy which has established
the procedure of collective bargaining as the most effective means of promoting
its basic purpose: the stabilization of industrial relations.' Thus, when an em-
ployer interferes with organizational solicitation and distribution on the part
of his employees, he engages in an unfair labor practice in violation of Section
8(a) (1)4 of the Act.
Employees, however, cannot wield these organizational instruments without
limit. Solicitation and distribution rights granted under Section 7 of the Act
must be balanced against employers' fifth amendment property rights.5 Thus,
when employees engage in organizational activity on an employer's property,
t During the time between the completion of this article and its publication, the Supreme
Court heard the Magnavox appeal and reversed the Sixth Circuit's denial of enforcement.
NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 42 U.S.L.W. 4300 (U.S. Feb. 27, 1974). The Court's terse opinion
merely adopted the Board's Magnavox position, holding that employees' Section 7 organiza-
tional rights are too fundamental to be contracted away. It also expressed the Board's fear
that a ratification of the contractual waiver theory would induce incumbent unions to rely
on it for their self-perpetuation. In so deciding the Court virtually ignored the argument that
an emasculation of the contractual waiver privilege, while guaranteeing rights to individual
employees, would in turn weaken the collective bargaining power of the bargaining represen-
tative and frustrate the basic purpose of the Act. In the author's opinion, this decision was
superficial and against the weight of reason. The following article may, therefore, be taken as a
criticism of it.
1 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970):
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any
or all of such activities....
2 The implicit right of solicitation was recognized in Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B.
828 (1943), enforced, 142 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 730 (1944), and
Le Tourneau 'Co. of Ga., 54 N.L.R.B. 1253, 1259-60 (1944), aff'd sub nom. Republic Avia-
tion Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945); that of distribution of literature was noted in
Walton Mfg. Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 697 (1960), enforced, 289 F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 1961).
3 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970). This section provides in part:
[P]rotection by law of the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively ...
promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized sources of industrial
strife and unrest....
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce . . . by encouraging
the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by
workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representa-
tives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions
of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.
4 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970):
[8](a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section [7] ....
5 "No person shall . .. be deprived of .. . property, without due process of law; nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend.
V.
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they often find that the employer can restrict their solicitation and distribution
opportunities in favor of his ownership interests.
The National Labor Relations Board and the federal courts have scrutinized
employer-promulgated no-solicitation and no-distribution provisions in a long
line of cases6 and have developed clear and workable guidelines for determining
their validity or invalidity. A few critical questions remain, however. Can a
union, as bargaining representative for employees, waive their rights to solicit
members and distribute literature in its collective bargaining contract with man-
agement? If so, whom does the waiver bind-members of the incumbent union
only or rival union members and anti-union employees as well? Does the waiver
take too much of the bite from Section 7 of the Act and thereby endanger, if
not destroy, the organizational right it guarantees? And if such a contract pro-
vision cannot stand, is there not a violation of the principles of collective bar-
gaining and freedom of contract as well as a neglect of employer property rights?
To look to the Board or to the courts for unequivocal answers to these ques-
tions is to look in vain, for the former has changed its position on the matter
twice, and the United States courts of appeal which have considered this type of
waiver are in conflict over its validity. This article will review the history of the
contractual relinquishment of solicitation and distribution rights and will discuss
the merits and demerits of each side of the dispute as it presently stands in the
law. The uncertainty in this area of labor relations has persisted for more than
a decade; it is time for a resolution.
I. Solicitation-Distribution Rights: General Background
The National Labor Relations Board articulated its policy on solicitation
rights in 1943 in its Peyton Packing Company decision." That decision, the
source of the oft-quoted statement, "Working time is for work,"8 explained that
an employer's prohibition of organizational solicitation on his property during
working hours is presumptively valid unless adopted or enforced for a discrimina-
tory purpose or unless no alternative means of communication are available to
the employees.' Conversely, a presumption of invalidity attaches to a no-solicita-
tion rule applicable to nonworking hours; the employer can rebut this presump-
tion only by showing that "special circumstances" make the rule "necessary in
order to maintain production or discipline."'" Otherwise, the rule acts as an
6 See text accompanying notes 7-15 infra.
7 49 N.L.R.B. 828 (1943), enforced, 142 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323
U.S. 730 (1944).
8 Id. at 843.
9 For an example of invalidation where no reasonable, alternative means of communica-
tion were available to employees, see NLRB v. Stowe Spinning Co., 336 U.S. 226 (1949), rev'g
165 F.2d 609 (4th Cir. 1947), modifying 70 N.L.R.B. 614 (1946) (pro-union employee in a
company town denied permission to use an employer-owned auditorium for organizational
solicitation).
10 49 N.L.R.B. at 844. Such special circumstances appeared in May Dep't Stores Co.,
59 N.L.R.B. 976 (1944), modified, 154 F.2d 533 (8th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 725(1946), where a nonworking hours no-solicitation rule was upheld as applied to the selling
floor of a department store. Solicitation in that part of the building obviously interfered with
sales efficiency. See also Marshall Field & Co., 98 N.L.R.B. 88 (1952), modified, 200 F.2d
375 (7th Cir. 1952), and Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 747 (1959),
modified, 277 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1960).
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interference with Section 7 organizational rights and is thus a violation of Section
8(a) (1). Two years later the Supreme Court of the United States embraced
the Peyton Packing rationale in Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB," and the
work-time/nonwork-time distinction has stood ever since. 2
For nearly twenty years after Peyton Packing the Board subjected no-dis-
tribution rules to the same requirements it had formulated for no-solicitation
rules. Its 1962 decisions in Stoddard-Quirk Manufacturing Co.' and Young
Spring and Wire Corp.,'4 however, noted that distribution of literature differs
from solicitation in that the material distributed is likely to be littered or to be
kept and read during working hours even though the distribution permissibly
occurred during nonworking hours. Finding that these differences could result
in further interference with production, the Board expanded the validity of
no-distribution rules: to give additional protection to his property rights and to
his interest in a clean, efficient plant and uninterrupted production, the employer
can ban the distribution of literature at all times in working areas. 5 The pre-
sumptive validity of such a promulgation can be rebutted by employee proof of
special circumstances such as discriminatory enforcement or lack of alternative
means of communication. The employees retain the right to distribute in non-
working areas during nonworking time; the presumption of invalidity of a rule
denying them this right can only be overturned by proof of the rule's special
necessity to promote production, discipline, or safety.'
In summary, employees have the statutory rights to engage in organizational
solicitation in any areas during nonworking hours and to distribute organizational
literature in nonworking areas during nonworking hours unless unusual circum-
stances intervene. It remains to be considered whether they can, consistent with
Section 7 of the Act, contractually waive these rights through their union bar-
gaining representative.
II. Early Decisions: Contractual Waiver Upheld
The first indication that the Board would uphold the validity of a waiver
of solicitation rights came not by outright declaration but by implication in
North American Aviation, Inc." In that case the respondent corporation had an
absolute no-solicitation rule that was the target of an unfair labor practice charge
under Section 8(a) (1) of the Act. In defense the corporation offered a pro-
vision in its contract with the union that permitted solicitation except "on com-
pany time." It claimed that this clause superseded and rendered nugatory the
presumptively-invalid no-solicitation rule. The Board had this to say about the
respondent's contention:
11 324 U.S. 793 (1945). See also Walton Mfg. Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 697 (1960), enforced,
289 F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 1961), in which the Board clearly reaffirmed the work-time/nonwork-
time distinction of Peyton Packing and Republic Aviation.
12 See, e.g., Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615, 617 (1962); Standard Mfg. Co.,
147 N.L.R.B. 1608, 1609 n.4 (1964); Excelsior Underwear, Inc.. 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1241
n.10 (1966); J.L. Hudson Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 19 '(July 12, 1972).
13 138 N.L.R.B. 615 (1962).
14 138 N.L.R.B. 643 (1962).
15 138 N.L.R.B. at 621.
16 Id.
17 56 N.L.R.B. 959 (1944).
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[Nothing is said in the contract concerning the right of the employees to
engage in such activities on company property on their own time, and,
while such right may be said to be implicitly declared in the afore-mentioned
provision, we do not believe that a matter so vital to the employees' exer-
cise of their right to self-organization should be left open to construction.' 8
In other words, the Board felt that the contract provision was too vague to show
conclusively the employer's intent to allow solicitation. This implied, however,
that a clearly-worded clause recognizing such organizational right, or denying it,
would have the effect of superseding any unilaterally-promulgated rule on the
matter.'
9
While North American Aviation hinted that a union representative can
surrender employees' organizational rights through the collective bargaining
agreement, May Department Stores Co." openly endorsed that position:
Granted, then, that the Union did enter into such contracts with the owners
of other department stores, . . . [we assume] that it could thus effectively
bargain away the employees' right to engage in self-organizational activities
on the employer's premises during nonworking -hours .... Such an agree-
ment by the Union, arising, as it does, out of the "give and take" of collec-
tive bargaining, may, for aught that appears here, represent a concession
made by it in exchange for the employer's agreement on other vital terms
of the contract.
.. T]he employees embraced by these contracts, on the assumption
that the latter were entered into by organizations which represented a
majority of the employees in an appropriate unit, have thereby effectively
bargained away their right to engage in union solicitation on the respon-
dent's premises. Consequently, and so long as the contractual provisions
in question remain in effect, the respondent's prohibition against union
solicitation on the respondent's premises at all times by employees covered
by such contracts, is not to be deemed improper.21
This policy statement did not have a direct bearing on the outcome of the case
and only appeared in a note, but its language is unmistakable. The Board inti-
mated that employees can lawfully exchange Section 7 solicitation rights for
other important contractual concessions through the medium of collective bar-
gaining-a medium which the Act expressly encourages. 2
The Board relied on May Department Stores in deciding W.T. Smith
Lumber Co. 21 The respondent lumber company had barred all employee solid-
tation on its premises even during nonworking hours. Although presumptively
18 Id. at 963.
19 North Am. Aviation thus helped to inspire a long line of cases holding that a con-
tractual waiver of any right guaranteed by the Act must be in "clear and unmistakable"
language. See, e.g., Tide Water Associated Oil Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1096, 1098 (1949); Hekman
Furniture Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 631, 632 (1952), enforced, 207 F.2d 561 (6th Cir. 1953);
NLRB v. J.H. Allison & Co., 165 F.2d 766, 768 (6th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 814
(1948); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 746, 751 (6th Cir. 1963); Texaco,
Inc. v. NLRB, 462 F.2d 812, 815 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1008 (1972).
20 59 N.L.R.B. 976 (1944), modified, 154 F.2d 533 (8th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329
U.S. 725 (1946).
21 Id. at 981-82 n.17 (dictum).
22 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
23 79 N.L.R.B. 606 (1948).
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invalid, the rule was held by the Board to be enforceable because it was included
in the union-management contract.24 After this dear application of the con-
tractual waiver principle, succeeding Board decisions treated it as a recognized
rule. The Bethlehem Steel Co.25 trial examiner's report, adopted by the Board,
cited it approvingly;26 and Fruitvale Canning Co." used it exclusively to uphold
an otherwise overbroad no-solicitation rule:
[Tihe then existing collective bargaining agreement privileged the Respon-
dent to promulgate a rule prohibiting union solicitation on the Respondent's
premises by nonsupervisory employees. . . . T]his Board has previously
given its sanction to bargaining contracts which prohibit union activities
by nonsupervisory employees on an employer's premises during employees'
nonworking hours.2
8
The Board's unqualified ratification of contractual waiver of solicitation
rights by employees through their union bargaining representatives extended
beyond Fruitvale Canning into the 1950's and early 1960's.29 It was based on
the belief that freedom of contract in a collective bargaining context is the most
effective means for employers and employees to reach mutually satisfactory agree-
ments. According to this theory, if the employees allow their union agent to
bargain away their solicitation and distribution rights for, say, an increased pay
rate, they are bound by his renunciation of those rights in the agreement with
management. The end result of such a waiver is the promotion of industrial
peace and harmony-a basic purpose of the Act."0
But as the contractual waiver policy first unveiled in May Department
Stores moved into the 1960's, the Board expressed partial dissatisfaction with it
by disapproving the enforcement of blanket bans on employees' organizational
activities whether or not the prohibitions were part of a collective bargaining
agreement.
III. The Gale Products Precedent: Rival Unions, Dissident
Employees, and Conflict in the Courts
Gale Products, Division of Outboard Marine Corp." was the first case to
express the Board's dissatisfaction with its contractual waiver policy. The deci-
sions preceding it involved violations of no-solicitation contract clauses by em-
ployees representing incumbent unions only; in Gale Products a rival union
attempting to oust the official bargaining representative distributed membership
application cards on the employer's premises. Since this activity breached the
24 Id. at 616.
25 89 N.L.R.B. 341 (1950).
26 Id. at 363.
27 90 N.L.R.B. 884 (1950).
28 Id. at 885.
29 See, e.g., the Board's adoption of the trial examiners' reports in Procter & Gamble Mfg.
Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 2, 12 (1953); Clinton Foods, Inc., 112 N.L.R.B. 239 263-64 (1955);
Publishers' Ass'n of New York City, 139 N.L.R.B. 1092, 1112 n.14 (1962), aff'd, 327 F.2d
292 (2d Cir. 1964).
30 See note 3 supra.
31 142 N.L.R.B. 1246 (1963), enforcement denied, 337 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1964).
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clause prohibiting all solicitation and distribution, the employer enforced his
rule by discharging several members of the challenging union. The trial examiner
relied on May Department Stores to uphold both the validity and enforcement
of the clause; but the Board, obviously disturbed with this result, refused to
accept it, deciding that a contractual waiver of organizational rights cannot bind
those employees belonging to a union other than the contracting union:
[TIn the circumstances of this case, an unlimited contractual prohibition
against union solicitation and distribution would unduly hamper the em-
ployees in exercising their basic rights under the Act.
... Needless to say, neither an employer nor an incumbent union is
entitled, absent special circumstances which do not appear here, to freeze
out another union by trenching on statutory rights of employees to engage
in protected activities....
We find, therefore, that the contract clause is invalid insofar as it pro-
hibits any distribution of literature during nonwork times in nonwork areas
and any solicitation of membership on nonwork time on behalf of a labor
organization other than the contracting union, because it interferes with the
employees' right freely to select their representatives as guaranteed by
Section 7 of the Act.82
Simply stated, the Board's holding was that Section 7 on-premises organiza-
tional rigts are so fundamental that they cannot be contracted away so as to
prevent their exercise by employees desiring to express their dissatisfaction with,
or replace, the bargaining representative. The decision thus expanded the scope
of Section 7 rights by curbing the baser tendencies of incumbent unions to self-
perpetuation through contract agreements. 3 It was a noble attempt, but it failed
to convince the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which denied enforce-
ment.8 That court reiterated the May Department Stores view: the solicitation-
distribution rights granted by the Act are not so fundamental that they cannot
be bargained away "in favor of the available alternatives thereto."" Such a
waiver binds even a rival union; that the Board does not consider this a desirable
result is not to be controlling:
The "desirability" of collective bargaining contract provisions from the
standpoint of either the employees or the employer is not the measure of
their validity. Moreover, the arrangement here involved is conducive to
the stabilization of labor relations during the contract period and thus in
harmony with a prime objective of the Act.36
32 Id. at 1249-50 (emphasis added).
33 See also Chevrolet Motor Div., Gen. Motors Corp., 144 N.L.R.B. 862 (1963), and
Aladdin Indus., Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 1392, 1405-06 (1964), both of which follow the Gale
Products rule.
34 NLRB v. Gale Products, Div. of Outboard Marine Corp., 337 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1964).
35 Id. at 392.
36 Id.
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Undaunted by this setback, the Board reaffirmed its Gale Products rule in
Armco Steel Corp." in which another rival union had distributed literature in
contravention of the collective bargaining agreement. This time it was the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit which set aside the Board's order."
In the first place, the court felt that the Section 7 distribution right is not
so fundamental that it cannot be waived so as to prevent all employees from
exercising it. The court then cited other rights "of equal or greater significance" 9
the waiver of which has been upheld: among them the strike,40 management func-
tions,4 ballot and recognition, 2 union security,43 and hiring by union foremen."
It stressed the importance of freedom of contract to both unions and employers,
cautioning the Board that it may invalidate a union-management contract
clause only when it "violates a specific statute and is illegal,"" which was not
the case here.
The court further criticized the Board for the inconsistency of its Gale Prod-
ucts decision: by allowing employees of rival unions to escape the embrace of
the no-distribution dause while binding to its provisions those employees loyal to
the incumbent union, the Board was using an unfair double standard that
threatens industrial peace rather than promotes it in accordance with the policy
of the Act.
For these reasons the Sixth Circuit proposed a "special circumstances" test
of its own: the contractual surrender of solicitation-distribution rights is pre-
sumptively valid unless special circumstances, such as discriminatory enforcement
or inadequate alternate means of communication, 8 make it necessary to delete the
applicable provision." The court felt that this test can best maintain the delicate
balance between the rights of labor and those of management.4
General Motors Corp.,49 a Board ruling dealing with facts similar to those
in Armco Steel, met the same fate at the hands of the Sixth Circuit. The Board
decided that dissident employees as well as rival unions cannot be bound by the
incumbent union's waiver of distribution rights in the agreement with manage-
37 148 N.L.R.B. 1179 (1964), enforcement denied, 344 F.2d 621 (6th Cir. 1965).
38 Armco Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 344 F.2d 621 (6th Cir. 1965).
39 Id. at 624.
40 Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
41 NLRB v. American Natl Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
42 NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
43 Radio Officers' Union of Commercial Telegraphers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17
(1954).
44 NLRB v. News Syndicate Co., 365 U.S. 695 (1961). It should also be noted here
that it is well-settled that solicitation and distribution rights can be waived uncategorically by
contract if no Section 7 organizational activity is involved, and if the waiver is in clear and
unmistakable language. See Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 405 F.2d 1, 5
(5th Cir. 1968), and Texaco, Inc. v. NLRB, 462 F.2d 812, 815 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1008 (1972).
45 344 F.2d at 624.
46 Inadequate alternate means of communication were found in General Elec. Co., 169
N.L.R.B. 1101 (1968), enforced, 411 F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1969), where off-premises solicita-
tion would have required employees to obstruct fast-moving highway traffic entering the
company's parking lots.
47 344 F.2d at 624-25.
48 In the connected case of NLRB v. E.W. Buschman Co., 380 F.2d 255 (6th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1045 (1968), rehearing denied, 390 U.S. 975 (1968), the Sixth Circuit
also held that the bargaining representative can waive employees' organizational rights by send-
ing a letter to the employer approving his no-solicitation rule.
49 147 N.L.R.B. 509 (1964), enforcement denied, 345 F.2d 516 (6th Cir. 1965).
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ment. It relied on the Gale Products rule in reaching this determination. The
court, relying on its Armco Steel decision, set aside the Board's order.5"
In the face of such adamance, the Board decided to acquiesce and dis-
missed the complaint when Armco Steel came before it again," this time in a
suit by the rival union against the incumbent. 2 It warned, however, that it
would adhere to the Gale Products doctrine in future cases,53 and did so in a
number of decisions that were left unmolested by other United States courts of
appeal.54
Mid-States Metal Products, Inc.5 was the next significant case in this area.
The Board again cited its Gale Products precedent as the basis for invalidating
a no-solicitation, no-distribution contract clause to the extent that it forbade
such activities "in behalf of any labor organization other than the contracting
labor organization, or . . . against any labor organization. . . ."" Clearly, the
Board now meant to preserve the Section 7 rights of both rival unions and anti-
union employees. The Fifth Circuit enforced the Board's order,5 taking a posi-
tion contrary to that of the Sixth and Seventh Circuits. More importantly, it
expressed its disapproval of the inconsistent Gale Products rule, maintaining
that the contractual waiver of self-organizational rights is inherently invalid,
absent unusual circumstances, as to all employees:
The rights to distribute materials and solicit in organizing for collective
bargaining are rights of individual employees, relating to their selecting (or
choosing not to select) and constantly reevaluating their collective bargain-
ing agent. They are to be distinguished from rights which employees acting
in concert, through the collective bargaining agent, may exercise in attempts
to achieve economic advantage.
h . Mhe rationale of allowing waiver by the union disappears where
the subject matter waived goes to the heart of the right of employees to
change their bargaining representative, or to have no bargaining represen-
tative, a right with respect to which the interests of the union and employees
may be wholly adverse. 5
According to the court, solicitation and distribution rights are so funda-
mental that the incumbent union can never bargain them away unless necessity
of the employer (i.e., promotion of production, discipline, or safety) requires it.
50 Gen. Motors Corp. v. NLRB, 345 F.2d 516 (6th Cir. 1965).
51 Armco Employees Independent Fed'n, Inc., 155 N.L.R.B. 551 (1965), aff'd, 377 F.2d
140 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
52 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) provides:
[8](b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed in Section [7] of this title ....
53 When it encountered Armco Steel for yet a third time (under a new contract con-
taining the same provision), the Board still maintained that the contract clause violated the
Act, 183 N.L.R.B. No. 26 (June 10, 1970). Upon reconsideration, the complaint was finally
dismissed on procedural grounds, 184 N.L.R.B. No. 109 (Aug. 17, 1970).
54 E.g., American Int'l Aluminum Corp., 149 N.L.R.B. 1205 n.2 (1964) (contracting
union must agree to the terms of the proposed no-solicitation rule, not just to the employer's
right to post it); H. & F. Binch Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 929, 935 (1967).
55 156 N.L.R.B. 872 (1966), enforced, 403 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1968).
56 156 N.L.R.B. at 873.
57 NLRB v. Mid-States Metal Products, Inc., 403 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1968).
58 Id. at 705.
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They are rights of individual employees that are not to be interfered with by
unions."
A year after Mid-States Metal Products the Eighth Circuit entered the con-
troversy on the side of the Fifth Circuit in International Association of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers, District Number 9 v. NLRB." The Board had used
the Gale Products principle yet again to strike down a no-distribution contract
clause insofar as it applied to distribution "on behalf of a labor organization
other than the contracting union or on behalf of no labor organization at all." 61
The Eighth Circuit, however, amended that order so as to invalidate the pro-
vision and allow distribution "'on behalf of any labor organization or in opposi-
tion to any labor organization' ,,,.. subject to the normal rules on the limitation
of Section 7 organizational rights. To this court also these rights are fundamental,
personal, and nonwaivable by union action:
We recognize . . . the desirability of promoting stability in collective
bargaining relationships, but we believe that [the contract provision] goes
beyond that objective by prohibiting employees from exercising their right
to attempt to change or support their current bargaining agent through the
distribution of literature in nonwork areas during nonwork time. We believe
such a prohibition to be contrary to the letter and spirit of the Act."8
IV. The Magnavox Decision: Consistency From the Board,
Certiorari From the Supreme Court
Although there was disagreement among the circuits over the validity of
contractual waivers of solicitation-distribution rights, they joined in attacking
the Board's double-standard Gale Products rule. Obviously influenced by crit-
icism from the two courts which had enforced its recent waiver decisions,"
the Board reconsidered and finally jettisoned the inequitable aspect of that doc-
trine in Magnavox Co. of Tennessee:"
[W]e have difficulty in accepting as valid the two-sided remedy fashioned in
Gale Products. Certainly, we find nothing in the statute to suggest that
59 The Board had anticipated the position taken here by the Fifth Circuit in GeneralMotors Corp., 158 N.L.R.B. 1723, 1727-28 '(1966):[Tohe union and the employees are and remain separate entities for many purposes,
and the employees, by once selecting the union as their representative, do not forfeit
their fundamental right to change their representative at appropriate times. When a
union acts to abridge that right.., it is essentially benefiting the union qua union, to
the detriment of the employees it represents .... [To debar employees, in a significant
way, from their legal right to encourage a change of union representative . . . in-
fringes upon a right deeply rooted in the Act: the employees' freedom to change
their bargaining agent.
Nevertheless, the Board applied the Gale Products rule to the particular facts of the case, hold-
ing the contract provision binding on employees belonging to the incumbent union, but in-
validating it as to rival unions and those employees who wanted no labor organization at all.
60 415 F.2d 113 (8th Cir. 1969), modifying 171 N.L.R.B. 234 (1968).
61 Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 171 N.L.R.B. 234, 236 (1968).
62 415 F.2d at 116 (emphasis added).
63 Id. at 115.
64 The Fifth Circuit in Mid-States Metal Products and the Eighth Circuit in Int'l
Ass'n of Machinists.
65 195 N.L.R.B. 265 (1972), enforcement denied, 474 F.2d 1269 (6th Cir. 1973) (per
curiam), cert. granted, 94 S. Ct. 53 (1973).
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employees who wish to exercise their Section 7 right to reject a union repre-
sentative are entitled to more protection than employees who wish to exer-
cise the same Section 7 right to support a union representative....
Upon due reflection, . . . we believe the course mapped out for us by
the decision of the Eighth Circuit in Machinists v. N.L.R.B. . . . and
earlier suggested by the Fifth Circuit in Mid-States Metal Products .. .
best serves to effectuate the fundamental purposes of Section 7 of the Act
and the rights it guarantees.68
By thus refusing to enforce the no-distribution clause in question against any
employees, the Board turned full circle from a principle of presumptive validity
of contractual waiver to presumptive invalidity. If nothing else, it had again
adopted a consistent position. 7
The Sixth Circuit, however, was equally consistent in denying enforcement
of the Board's decision.6 s It adhered to its Armco Steel ruling, insisting that "the
bargaining representative has authority to waive on-premises distribution rights
of the employees at least in the absence of special circumstances not present
here." Magnavox has thus brought the contractual waiver controversy into
sharp relief. The issue has been joined, with the Board, Fifth and Eighth Cir-
cuits refusing to ratify the surrender of solicitation-distribution rights, and the
Sixth and Seventh Circuits maintaining that employees can collectively yield
them. The Supreme Court, in a timely grant of certiorari,7" has apparently
undertaken to resolve the case. The stage is set; therefore an evaluation of the
merits of the two conflicting positions is in order.
V. Collective Bargaining, Self-Organization and Industrial Peace:
A Question of Priorities Under the Act
The basic argument against the contractual waiver of Section 7 organiza-
tional rights is that they are simply too fundamental to the purposes of the Act
to be relinquished in any manner. They can be limited, of course, to accom-
modate the employer's interest in efficient, safe production, but can be discarded
by neither union nor management; this is because Congress has granted them to
each. individual employee, not to the collective body of employees that makes up
a union. The Act itself provides that "Employees shall have the right to self-
66 195 N.L.R.B. at 266.
67 The Board later fleshed out its Magnavox holding in Samsonite Corp., 206 N.L.R.B.
No. 91, (Oct. 11, 1973). Samsonite stated that the Magnavox test for the validity of a
waiver of distribution rights applies to nonunion as well as union distribution protected by
Section 7 of the Act. It also enunciated, albeit implicitly, an additional criterion for deter-
mining validity by noting that the contracting union did not show that it needed the ban on
distribution to make it a more effective bargaining agent. This raises some interesting ques-
tions: Can the incumbent union cite this "need to be a more effective bargaining agent?'
as a "special circumstance" that would uphold the otherwise impermissible waiver? If so,
how much "need" must the union prove---and how can it prove it? This part of the Samsonite
decision is vague, since all unions must strive to be better bargaining representatives. If it
becomes necessary to clarify and develop this point after the Magnavox case reaches its final
determination, the Board should do so as soon as possible.
68 Magnavox Co. of Tennessee v. NLRB, 474 F.2d 1269 (6th Cir. 1973) (per curiam),
cert. granted, 94 S. Ct. 53 (1973).
69 474 F.2d at 1270.
70 94 S. Ct. 53 (1973).
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organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations. .. ."" They engage
in collective bargaining through their union representative, but they enjoy the
personal rights to solicit and to distribute literature for the purpose of changing
that representative should they so desire. According to this point of view, if the
employees are deprived of these rights, organizational efforts are critically
hampered with the result that the individual workers must bend to the will of
either the employer or the incumbent union-a result that the Act seeks to
prevent.
The Board and the Fifth Circuit seem especially concerned about the pos-
sibility of the bargaining representative's use of the contractual waiver to elimi-
nate competition and perpetuate itself. In the later General Motors Corp. case,
the Board said:
[To treat the clause as simply the result of an arms-length transaction, as
if the Union were constrained to "assent!' to a clause which so clearly
advantages the Union (in its capacity as a union) at least as much as it
serves the purposes of the Employer, seems somewhat unrealistic to us....
That this interdiction furthers the organizational interests of the incumbent
union is unmistakably apparent.7 2
The Fifth Circuit spoke similarly in Mid-States Metal Products:
Solicitation and distribution of literature on plant premises are important
elements in giving full play to the right of employees to seek displacement
of an incumbent union. We cannot presume that the union, in agreeing
to bar such activities, does so as a bargain for securing other benefits for
the employees and not from the self-interest it has in perpetuating itself
as bargaining representative."5
Following this reasoning, waiver of organizational rights leaves employees with-
out vital protection on two fronts; both union and management are in positions
to exploit them.
The above argument, however, is parochial and overstates the case. It is
parochial because it places too much emphasis on the self-organizational right
and not enough on the most effective antidote that the Act provides to ward
off industrial strife-collective bargaining. Congress has adopted this method
as the most effective one for settling labor-management differences and preserving
peace between the two. 4 To implement this policy, Congress has provided:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective
bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such
purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such
71 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970) (emphasis added).
72 158 N.L.R.B. 1723, 1727 (1966).
73 403 F.2d at 705.
74 See 29 U.S.C. § 171(a) (1970), a provision of the Labor-Management Relations Act:
[Slound and stable industrial peace and the advancement of the general welfare ...
of the Nation and of the best interests of employers and employees can most satis-
factorily be secured by the settlement of issues between employers and employees
through the processes of conference and collective bargaining between employers and
the representatives of their employees....
[April 1974]
unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay,
wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment .... 75
Thus, the Act emphasizes collective bargaining and the exclusiveness of the
bargaining representative as well as the vital principle of freedom of contract."'
A strong argument can be made from this that the employer and the repre-
sentative are empowered to exercise a wide range of bargaining options, the
former to protect his property and production interests, the latter to obtain any
number of concessions for the employees. Who is to say, for example, that the
employees in an industrial unit would not be perfectly free to barter away their
rights of solicitation and distribution in exchange for an increase in overtime pay
rates?"7 If they are willing to do so, the waiver should be made; and collective
bargaining will have served once again to provide a mutually satisfactory agree-
ment, to strengthen the bargaining representative's clout with management, and
to promote industrial harmony. If they are unwilling to waive these rights, they
can make their feelings known to the union, even to the extent of rejecting the
proposed contract.""
The anti-waiver theory also overstates its case because the practical effects
of a contractual waiver are not so serious as the Board and its supporting courts
make them out to be. As noted above, the employees can either accept or reject
the waiver clause. If they accept it, they will have in most cases alternative means
of communication available to them--organizational activity other than on
company premises and on company time."' If these means are lacking, perhaps
the clause should be stricken from the agreement. Finally, the waiver may be
only short-term in duration; if the bargaining agreement is not renewed by the
employees, they are free to solicit and distribute as they wish when it expires.
75 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970) (emphasis added).
76 Freedom to contract is perhaps one of the most important rights enjoyed by
labor unions and employers. The Board has no power to interfere with the exercise
of that right or to sit in judgment on the wisdom of substantive contractual provisions.
It may interfere only when a clause in a contract violates a specific statute and is
illegal.
Armco Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 344 F.2d 621, 624 (6th Cir. 1965).
77 E.g., the Board Chairman's dissenting statement in Gale Products, 142 N.L.R.B. 1246,
1251 (1963):
We cannot agree that giving up the right to distribute campaign literature on
company premises involves a greater sacrifice than, for example, surrendering the
right to strike, which the Board and the courts have recognized may lawfully be
done.
See also text accompanying notes 39-44 supra.
78 See N. CHAMBERLAIN & J. KUHN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 195 (2d ed. 1965):
The fact that the membership ultimately holds within its power the giving of
union office means that at times it can force its leaders to conform to its wishes,
even when the leaders are opposed in principle....
. . . [A]greements are usually not completed until the members approve them,
and approval is by no means automatic. Disapproval can be seriously embarrassing
to the negotiators and politically dangerous to the union leaders. In recent years
rejection of negotiated agreements has ceased to be uncommon. The Federal Media-
tion and Conciliation Service estimates that in over 750 situations in 1962, rank-and-
file union members rejected settlements negotiated and approved by their leaders.
79 See, e.g., NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 107 (1956) (mail, telephones,
and homes of the workers were available to the union).
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These points demonstrate that contractual waiver only restricts organizational
rights further than usual; it in no way destroys them. 0
The anti-waiver position's final contention, as enunciated by the Board and
the Fifth Circuit,81 expresses the fear that incumbent unions may bargain for
waiver of organizational rights to further their own interests instead of the em-
ployees'. Such a sweeping presumption shows little confidence in the overall
integrity of labor unions but is grounded in reality to a certain extent. It is well-
known that many incumbent unions have become strong organizations with
vested interests in maintaining their influential positions as bargaining representa-
tives and that many dissatisfied employees consequently are discouraged, some-
times by coercion or fear, from challenging them. Such unions might well be
prone to take advantage of a contractual agreement that would stifle opposition
and consolidate their positions.
Even if this is true, however, the fault lies not with the waiver of organiza-
tional rights, but with the underlying policy of our national labor legislation. If
incumbent unions cannot be trusted on a large scale to act primarily for the
interests of the individual employees they represent, perhaps it is necessary to re-
evaluate the collective bargaining principle itself and adjust or even replace it if
necessary to fully protect employee rights.
On the other hand, the opposite view, particularly as espoused by the Sixth
Circuit in Armco Steel, has none of the liabilities that vex the anti-waiver
doctrine. It insures adequate protection of employee rights through a more faith-
ful adherence to the basic policy of the Act-the stabilization of industrial re-
lations through collective bargaining. In short, the contractual waiver of solicita-
tion and distribution rights by the bargaining representative should be pre-
sumptively valid unless the special circumstances of discriminatory enforcement
or lack of alternate means of communication require invalidation.
[B]asic collective bargaining principles are enhanced by allowing such con-
tract provisions. The freedom of the parties to contract is not restricted.
The exclusive representative concept is affirmed, thereby strengthening the
bargaining power of the employees' representative. The net result is to
stabilize the industrial relations between the employer and the union-an
extremely desirable objective.82
It is not only an extremely desirable objective-it is the overriding objective of the
National Labor Relations Act itself.
Timothy G. Westman
80 See Dereshinsky, The Solicitation and Distribution Rules of the NLRD, 40 U. CIN. L.
REv. 417, 449 (1971).
81 See text accompanying notes 72-73 supra.
82 Dereshinsky, supra note 80, at 451.
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